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The proliferation of FTAs appears to have affected economic conditions in many countries 
through foreign trade. We attempt to discern the impacts of FTAs on foreign trade by using two 
approaches. One approach is to examine the changes in trade patterns before and after an FTA 
by using indicators of intra-FTA interdependence. The second approach is the estimation of a 
gravity equation to discern the impacts of FTAs on bilateral trade flows, i.e. trade creation and 
diversion effects. In the latter approach we extend the previous studies by enlarging the sample 
size in terms of the time-period, and also undertake an analysis by disaggregating the trade data 
with a presumption that the impact of FTAs is different for different sectors. The results of the 
analysis revealed several interesting observations. Our analysis of the total trade indicates that 
FTAs bring about trade creation effect and that trade diversion effect is limited. Besides, the 
results of our analysis of disaggregated trade data show different patterns among different 
products, and they identify trade diversion effect for many products in the case of the EU, the 
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I. Introduction 
  The world has been witnessing a proliferation of regional trade agreements 
(RTAs), which include free trade agreements (FTAs) and customs unions. The 
cumulative number of RTAs that had been reported to the GATT (General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade) since its inception in 1948 was 25 in 1990
1. The number began to 
increase in the 1990s to a record 91 in 2000, and then accelerated to reach 194 as of 
March 1, 2007. Several notable developments should be recognized. First, many RTAs 
are FTAs, under which trade barriers between FTA members are removed but they 
maintain their own protection vis-à-vis non-FTA members. The number of customs 
unions, where members not only remove trade barriers between the members but also 
establish common external tariff vis-à-vis non-members, is small
2. Second, many FTAs 
go beyond the tariff removal to include other elements such as liberalization of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) policies, facilitation of trade and FDI, and economic 
cooperation. As such, the economic impacts of FTAs on FTA members and 
non-members are likely to be substantially larger compared to traditional FTAs. Third, 
FTAs were actively established in Europe, Africa and North and South America through 
the 1990s, but starting in the 21
st century the East Asian region joined other regions in 
establishing FTAs. In the East Asian region, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) has been playing a key role in establishing FTAs with other countries in East 
Asia. 
  The rapid expansion of FTAs is attributable to various factors. One important 
reason is the stalemate in the Doha Development Agenda, the on-going multilateral 
trade negotiation under the World Trade Organization (WTO). Faced with this situation, 
countries interested in the promotion of trade liberalization have pursued bilateral or 
plurilateral trade liberalization under FTAs with like-minded countries. Being concerned 
with possible exclusion from FTAs, an increasing number of countries began showing a 
strong interest in FTAs. 
  The proliferation of FTAs appears to have affected economic conditions in 
                                                  
1  WTO website, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/summary_e.xls 
2 As of March 1, 2007, out of 194 RTAs reported to the GATT/WTO, as many as 190 
RTAs, or 93 percent of total, are FTAs, while the remaining 14 RTAs, or 7 percent of 
total, are customs unions. (WTO website). Because of the large number of FTAs among 
RTAs, we use the term FTAs to indicate RTAs, unless otherwise noted.  3
many countries, not only FTA members but also non-members, through foreign trade. 
Two possible impacts, trade creation and trade diversion, may be realized as a result of 
FTAs. The trade creation effect means that the FTA eliminates trade barriers on trade 
among FTA members and, therefore, creates trade among them, while the trade 
diversion effect means that the FTA would replace imports of highly efficient 
non-member countries by imports from less efficient FTA members. Trade creation 
results in an improvement in resource allocation and economic welfare, while trade 
diversion worsens efficiency in resource allocation. Besides, trade diversion has a 
negative impact on non-members as they lose an exporting opportunity. While 
consumers in FTA members may increase welfare as the FTA enables them to buy 
imports at lower prices, an FTA member country in its totality may lose if the loss in 
government’s tariff revenue overwhelms the consumers’ gain. 
  To discern the impacts of FTAs on foreign trade, we undertake the analysis by 
using two approaches. One approach is to examine the changes in trade patterns before 
and after an FTA. Specifically, we measure the extent of dependency in foreign trade 
between and among FTA members. This approach is admittedly simplistic, but it 
provides useful information on the extent of trade dependency for different FTAs and its 
changes over time. The second approach is a more vigorous one, namely, the estimation 
of a gravity model to discern the impact of FTAs on bilateral trade flows, i.e. trade 
creation and diversion effects. The gravity model, which is built on the assumption that 
bilateral trade flows depend on the economic size of the two countries and the distance 
between them, has been used to assess the impacts of FTAs on bilateral trade flows. We 
extend the previous studies by enlarging the sample size both in terms of the number of 
countries and in terms of the time-period. We also undertake the analysis by 
disaggregating the trade data into five sub-sectors with a presumption that the impacts 
of FTAs would be different among different sectors, mainly because the removal of 
trade barriers under FTAs is different for different sectors. Specifically, agricultural 
products are prone to be excluded from the free trade list. Furthermore, we examine 
explicitly the impacts of trade-diversion of FTAs by taking account of trade between 
FTA members and non-members. 
  The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II examines the changing 
patterns of international trade among FTA member countries over time, in order to see if  4
any discernable changes such as the increase in intra-FTA member trade can be 
identified. The analysis in this section, which uses rather crude indicators, also provides 
some basic information on the international trade for different FTAs. Section III 
undertakes a rigorous analysis by applying a gravity model to assess the impacts of 
FTAs on international trade involving FTA members and non-members. In section III a 
brief survey of the literature is presented before proceeding to the main analysis. Section 
IV presents some concluding remarks. 
 
 
II. Intra-FTA Trade Dependency for Selected FTAs 
  FTAs are expected to promote trade among FTA members, possibly at the 
expense of trade with non-FTA members. By using a rather crude methodology, this 
section examines if these expected impacts are observed for a selected number of FTAs, 
before undertaking a more rigorous approach in the next section. As such, the analysis 
in this section may be considered to set the stage for a more detailed analysis in the next 
section. 
We use two indicators to examine the extent of intra-FTA interdependence
3. One 
is the share of intra-FTA members’ trade in FTA members’ overall trade (relative share) 
and the other is trade-intensity. The definitions of these two indicators are shown below. 
 
Relative share: Xii / Xiw 
    Trade intensity index: (Xii / Xiw) / (Xiw / Xww) 
 
where Xii represents intra-region (FTA) trade, Xiw region i’s trade with the rest 
of the world, and Xww world trade. 
Let us examine intra-regional dependence in foreign trade for a selected number 
of FTAs (Table 1). To begin with the relative share indicator, one observes that the 
relative share has risen in many FTAs with the exceptions of the EU (European Union), 
Japan-Singapore FTA, Singapore-USA FTA and Mexico-EU FTA after the enactment of 
                                                  
3  Schiff and Winters (2003) analyzes the impacts of FTAs (they use the term “regional 
integration agreements) by using various indicators including those used in this paper.  5
FTAs
4. For example, for the AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) the relative share 
increased from around 17 percent in the pre-AFTA years to 22-25 percent in the 
post-AFTA years. Similar patterns are observed for many other FTAs, although the 
increase in the relative share is less pronounced compared to the case for the AFTA. 
This finding indicates the possible trade creation for many FTAs.   
The relative shares show the importance of trade with FTA members for a 
country or a region under study. According to the computed figures for 2005, one finds 
that intra-FTA trade accounts for a large part of trade for the EU and the NAFTA (North 
American Free Trade Agreement), as the relative percentage shares of intra-FTA trade in 
overall trade for these two groups were 58.4 and 43 percent, respectively. Despite the 
smaller magnitude, the intra-FTA trade is important for the AFTA members, as the 
relative percentage share was recorded at 25.5 percent. The relative shares for Mercosur 
and China-ASEAN were of some significance with the figures exceeding 10 percent. 
Indeed, the relative share for the China-ASEAN FTA increased notably over time. For 
the remaining FTAs, the relative shares are very small, reflecting the limited importance 
of intra-FTA trade for the countries involved.     
The second indicator we examine is the trade intensity index, which measures 
the “pure” intensification of trading relationship. An increase in trade with a country 
may be attributable to two factors. One is the expansion of trade by a trading partner 
and the other is “pure” intensification of the trade relationship. Specifically, trade 
relationship of a country with (or trade dependency of a country on) a trading partner 
country can increase when the trading partner’s trade expands faster than other countries. 
Taking into account this factor, we compute trade intensity index and its changes over 
time. Trade intensity index captures the “bias” in bilateral trade relationship by 
considering the trade volume of the trading partner. Trade relationship is more (less) 
intensive (or biased) than normal if the value of trade intensity is greater (less) than 
unity. 
According to the computed results shown in Table 1, it appears that trade 
intensity increased after the establishment of FTAs for the NAFTA, the Mercosur, the 
CER, and the AFTA (recent years). It may be pointed out that trade intensity for 
Japan-Mexico increased rather noticeably in 2005 after the enactment of the 
                                                  
4  The figures with the shade indicate that corresponding FTA is in effect.  6
Japan-Mexico FTA, although its magnitude is very small at 0.217. 
An examination of the trade intensity figures reveals wide variations in the 
intensity of intra-FTA relationships among different FTAs. In 2005 the Mercosur was 
found to show the strongest intra-FTA trade relationship, as the trade intensity index 
was recorded at 7.8. The Mercosur was followed by the CER (5.6) and the AFTA (4.5). 
In addition to these FTAs, the EU and the NAFTA recorded the value greater than unity. 
These findings indicate that trade relationships among FTA members are quite strong, or 
above average, for the EU, the NAFTA, the AFTA, the Mercosur and the CER. By 
contrast, trade relationships among FTA members are rather weak, or below average, for 
the remaining FTAs, Japan-Singapore, Japan-Mexico, China-ASEAN, Korea-Chile, 
Singapore-USA, and Mexico-EU. 
In this section we examined the impacts of FTAs on trade relationship between 
and among FTA members. We found that some FTAs including the NAFTA, the AFTA, 
the MERCOSUR and the CER appeared to have produced trade-creation effect, while 
for other FTAs such effect was not observed. We further found that intra-FTA trade 
relationship is important and intense for the EU, the NAFTA, the AFTA, the Mercosur 
and the CER, while it is not so for other FTAs. The analysis in this section has provided 
useful information on the impacts of FTAs on international trade for the FTA members, 
but the analysis was rather crude, as it could not isolate the impacts of FTAs from other 
factors that influence international trade such as economic size of the countries involved. 
Furthermore, the analysis in this section was not precise in that no statistical assessment 
was made. To remedy these problems and to discern the impacts of FTAs on 
international trade for the FTA members and non-members, we undertake an analysis by 
applying the gravity model in the next section.   
 
 
III. The Impacts of FTAs on Bilateral Trade Flows: An Application of a Gravity Model 
Our analysis is based on estimating a gravity model, which tries to explain the 
volume of trade between the two countries by their market size and geographical 
distance. The gravity model has been shown to have theoretical foundations in 
international trade theory, as discussed in Anderson (1979). We begin our analysis by 
presenting a brief summary of literature survey of the empirical application of the  7
gravity model. We then conduct our analysis first by examining the trade creation effect 
of FTAs and then the trade creation and trade diversion effects jointly. 
 
III.1 A Brief Survey of the Literature 
The gravity model has been applied extensively in cross-country analysis of 
bilateral international trade flows for more than four decades. Tinbergen (1962) and 
Pöyhönen (1963) are early pioneers in applying the gravity model to study international 
trade flows, and since then numerous empirical analyses using the model have been 
conducted to provide various verifications and implications on international trade. Since 
the mid-1980s theoretical foundations of the gravity model have been provided within 
the framework of the international trade theory based on imperfect substitutes, 
increasing return to scale and product differentiation at firm-level. Since the 1990s, the 
gravity model has attracted a lot of attention in the analysis of international trade as a 
result of renewed interest in economic geography, which considers geographic and other 
kinds of ‘distance’ as an important factor in economic activities. 
The gravity equation has been a popular methodology to study the effects on 
trade of international trading system such as the WTO and regional trading arrangement 
such as FTAs and currency unions. Timbergen (1962) was the first attempt to examine 
the effects of FTA on trade, and he found significant positive effects among members of 
the British Commonwealth but insignificant for the Benelux FTA. In the 1970s and 
1980s several studies analyzed the effects of major regional trade agreements and 
schemes, such as the EEC (European Economic Community), EFTA (European Free 
Trade Association) and LAFTA (Latin America Free Trade Agreement) (Aitken (1973) 
and Brada and Mendez (1983), etc.). In order to capture the effects of the FTAs on trade 
flows, they added a dummy variable, which takes the value of unity if country pairs 
belong to the same FTA, to the standard gravity model. This dummy variable method 
has been used for many studies on this subject since then. 
In the light of rapid expansion of FTAs since the 1990s, an increasing number 
of studies have attempted to examine the impacts of various FTAs by applying the 
gravity model. Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) and Frankel (1997) examined the effects 
of major FTAs, such as the EU, the NAFTA, the MECOSUR and the AFTA, and they 
found significant positive effects in the cases of the MERCOSUR and the AFTA but not  8
in the cases of the EU or the NAFTA. Solaga and Winters (2000) also attempted to 
capture the trade creation and two-way trade diversion effects of major multilateral 
FTAs. They found significantly positive effect on trade creation for the FTAs only in 
Latin American countries, and they also found significant trade diversion effects for the 
cases of the EU and the EFTA. Endoh (1999) analyzed the trade creation and trade 
diversion effects of the EEC, LAFTA and CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance, COMECON), and he found both effects for these FTAs, and he also 
observed that the effects were diminishing in the 1990s. As the results of these studies 
indicate, the estimated results on the effects of FTAs on trade flows by using the gravity 
model are not uniform but mixed. 
Several attempts have been made to discern the effects of FTAs more in detail 
in recent years. Taking account of the improvement in the estimation method, Baier and 
Bergstrand (2002) treated FTA dummies as endogenous variables, and they showed that 
the effect of FTAs on trade flows is quadrupled. Carrere (2003) applied Baier and 
Bergstrand’s specification to panel data analyses, and derived the result showing that 
FTAs generated a significant increase in trade in contrast to previous results. Chen and 
Tsai (2005) constructed a modified gravity model and compared the results by using 
panel data. They found that the estimated values are different among different FTAs. 
Although the trade creation effects of FTAs are found in many cases, a lot of 
studies suggest that the magnitude of the effects depends on the time period and other 
circumstances. Based on the notion that the impact of FTAs on trade differs depending 
on the products, several studies have conducted analyses at disaggregated sector levels. 
Gilbert, Scollay and Bora (2004) attempted to find out the effects of major FTAs and 
natural trading blocs in East Asia by sector, and they obtained the results that natural 
trading blocs in East Asia exist in merchandise and manufacturing sectors. Endoh 
(2005) investigated the effects of GSTP  (Generalized System of Trade Preferences) 
among developing countries on trade of capital goods, and he found that the trade 
between GSTP countries increased significantly.
5 
In the light of the results from the earlier studies, in this paper we extend the 
earlier analyses by using a large up-to-date data sample and a disaggregated dataset in 
                                                  
5 Besides, Fukao, Okubo and Stern (2003) provide an econometric analysis on trade 
diversion effects of the NAFTA by using HS 2digit level data, in partial equilibrium 
framework.  9
order to deepen our understanding of the impacts of FTAs on trade flows.   
 
III.2 The Model and the Estimated Results 
  We conduct the estimation of the gravity model to assess the impacts of FTAs 
on international trade flows. We apply the estimation by using two types of datasets, 
aggregate and disaggregate trade datasets. 
 
III.2.1 The Analysis of ‘‘general FTA’’ effect 
 
The model 
We use a standard gravity equation to discern the impacts of FTA on bilateral 
merchandise trade. First we estimate the following equation (1) to examine “general 
FTA effects” for total merchandise trade flows between countries i and j. 
 
) 1 ( Timedum FTA Language Adjacency ) ce tan Dis ln(
) IncomeGAP ln( ) y * y ln( ) Y * Y ln( ) Trade ln(
t
t t ijt ijt 6 ijt 5 ijt 4
3 jt it 2 jt it 1 ijt
∑ + + + + +
+ + + =
γ φ β β β
β β β α
 
where, Tradejit denotes total export value between country i and j in year t, and it is the 
sum of the exports of country i to j and the exports of country j to i. Y and y denote GDP 
and GDP per capita, respectively. Log of the absolute value of difference of GDP per 
capita is also included to estimate the effect of the difference of income between a 
country pair on trade flows. Distance indicates the geographical distance in km between 
the largest cities of countries i and j. Adjacency and Language are dummy variables, 
where Adjacency is given the value of unity if countries i and j share the common 
border, and Language is given the value of unity if common official languages are 
shared by countries i and j. FTA denotes a “general FTA effects”, and it is binary 
variable which is unity if country i belongs to the same FTA with country j or otherwise 
given zero. We construct this variable based on 22 regional trade agreements and 86 
bilateral trade agreements which are notified to the GATT and the WTO up to 
September 2006. Timedum is a nested dummy variable which is used to capture external 
annual time effect during the sample period.   
Among the explanatory variables, Y and y are a proxy for economic scale and  10
income level, respectively, and their estimated signs are expected to be positive because 
the larger economic scale and the higher income level promote trade. The difference of 
income between country pair can have both positive and negative impacts on trade 
flows. A large income gap may increase vertical (inter-industry) trade, while a small 
income gap may increase horizontal (intra-industry) trade. The distance variable reflects 
both tangible and intangible trade costs. The sign is expected to be negative as the 
longer the distance, the larger the cost. Both dummy variables of Adjacency and 
Language also reflect tangible and intangible trade costs such as transportation cost and 
cultural similarity, so that these estimated coefficients are expected to be positive. The 
binary variable FTA captures a “general FTA effect” on trade flows, and we expect the 
estimated relation to be positive, if the trade creation effect emerges. 
 
The Data 
The sample for the estimation includes 178 countries over the 1950-2005 
period (Appendix Table 2). The sample is constructed by expanding the dataset 
constructed by Rose (2005). We use bilateral trade value, GDP, GDP per capita, distance 
between pair countries, dummy variables of common language and adjacency during 
1950-1999 from his dataset, and expand these variables by using Direction of Trade 
Statistics and International Financial Statistics of the IMF (International Monetary 
Fund), World Development Indicators of the World Bank up to the year 2005. Trade 
data are taken from Direction of Trade Statistics (DOT) of IMF. Since the data from 
DOT are expressed in nominal US dollars, we deflated the value by consumer price 
Index of USA (2000=1) in the same way as Rose (2004). The dummy variables of 
Distance, Adjacency and Common language are set constant during the sample period. 
Missing values are taken out, and as such the number of samples varies among the 
estimations. 
 
The Estimation Method 
To begin with, we conduct the structural change test because the sample has 
large time series dimension. We apply the cumulative sum of recursive residual test 
(CUSUM test) to judge whether the structural change had occurred during the period. 
CUSUM test for the panel data proposed by Maskus (1983) is applied using weighted  11
sum of residuals across cross-sectional units. Although the statistic value does not 
exceed either upper or lower confidence boundaries during the sample periods, the 
value is found to vary from zero since the year 1984. Therefore we divide the entire 
sample period into two sub-periods, 1950-1983 and 1984-2005. In addition we produce 
one sub- group which consists of OECD country pair groups for comparison. 
Regarding the estimation method, we have to deal with two problems. The first 
problem is about heteroskedasticity and auto correlation with disturbance for the large 
panel data set. We found panel level heteroskedasticity and first order autocorrelation by 
using LR test and Wooldridge’s test for autocorrelation in panel-data models
6. Based on 
the results of the tests, we apply the weighted ordinary least square (OLSQ) method 
with corrected errors to estimate parameters for pooled cross sectional and time series 
data for the benchmark result. The second problem is the bias arisen from correlation 
between some of the regressors and country pair-level effects included in the error term. 
In addition, endogeneity of the regressors gives rise to simultaneous determination such 
as the relation between GDP and bilateral trade flow. Therefore we apply the system 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) technique. The system GMM technique 
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1997) is the estimation of a system of two 
simultaneous equations, one equation in levels and the other in first differences, and 
these simultaneous equations are estimated with lagged levels and first differences 
instruments.
7 In the estimation procedure, we regard GDP and GDP per capita are 
endogenous variables, and use the Robust one-step estimation. 
 
The Results 
We apply the ordinary least squares method with corrected disturbance to 
estimate the equation (1) for all country pairs and OECD groups for the 1950-1983 and 
1984-2005 periods for benchmark results. In both cases the estimated coefficients of the 
standard set of variables, which are generally used in the gravity model estimation, are 
shown to have expected signs with statistical significance (Table 2). That is to say, the 
magnitude of bilateral trade is promoted by the economic size, income levels, and 
cultural similarities of the countries involved, while it is deterred by their geographical 
                                                  
6 We apply the test written by David Drukker to perform in STATA. 
7  We use STATA’s estimator ‘xtabond2’ provided by David Roodman.    12
distance. The estimated coefficients of the difference of income levels between country 
pairs for all samples are shown to have both positive and negative with statistical 
significance in the case of OLSQ estimations. The estimated coefficients for the GMM 
estimation are also shown to take both positive and negative signs, but they are not 
statistically significant. 
Concerning the estimated coefficient of ‘general FTA effect’, the estimated 
results of the FTA dummy variable show that FTAs promoted bilateral trade in almost 
all cases. Although the estimated coefficients from the OLSQ estimation tend to have 
upward bias, the coefficients of system GMM are also found to be significantly positive. 
The results also suggest that effects of FTA on trade flows are weaker for the second 
half of sample period than the first half. Although only eight RTAs
8 were  formed  during 
the first half sample period, these earlier RTAs including the EC, EFTA and CER tend to 
be formed with neighbors and major trade partner countries. A large number of bilateral 
FTAs which were formed during the latter half of the sample period, particularly after 
the latter half of 1990s, were not formed between major trade partners. Therefore, it is 
conceivable that the relation between FTA and trade flows became weaker over time. 
Indeed, the motivation behind the establishment of FTAs in recent years has become 
diversified as it is not only the trade promotion but also non-economic factors such as 
political factors that have played important roles in the establishment of FTAs. 
Regarding the estimation results by using the system GMM, the estimation 
needs to be improved because Hansen J statistics test for over-identifying restrictions 
are not satisfactory in the case of all samples for both periods and OECD for the first 
half period, and Alleano-Bond test for the serial correlation does not reject the null 
hypothesis of the absence of autocorrelation in the case of the first half period for the 
OECD countries. With an improvement of the model specification particularly 
concerning the problems related to the large T-panel and unbalanced panel data, the 
results suggest that general impacts of FTA on trade flows are positive and they tended 
to become weaker over sample periods. 
 
III.2.2 The Analysis of Trade Creation and Trade Diversion Effect 
                                                  
8 The RTAs are EC, EFTA, CACM, CARICOM, PATCRA, SPARTECA and CER. See 
Table A.4 for the details on RTAs included in ‘general FTA dummy’.  13
  The previous analysis examined the impacts of FTAs in general without 
considering specific FTAs such as the EU and the NAFTA. We now turn to the analysis 
of the impacts of specific FTAs on bilateral trade flows. In addition, we analyze not 
only the trade creation effect but also the trade diversion effect of FTAs. In order to 
analyze both trade creation and trade diversion effects, we specify the estimation 
equation by adding a non-FTA member dummy, which takes the value of unity if one 
country belongs to an FTA but the other country does not, to capture trade diversion 
effect. In order to examine the impact of FTAs more precisely, our FTA and non-FTA 
dummies are turned on or given the value of unity when FTAs in question are in effect 
and we introduce an FTA country pair dummy variable, which takes the value of unity 
for the entire sample period regardless of the status of FTAs. Such treatment would 
enable us isolate the impact of FTAs. 
As was mentioned in the previous section, our sample is unbalanced panel data, 
and thus we apply the weighted ordinary least square method for heteroskedasticity and 
first order autocorrelation at first to obtain the results for a bench mark. In addition we 
apply the fixed effect and random effect models for the estimation
9. When the null 
hypotheses, which states that individual effects are not correlated with the regressors, 
are rejected by the Hausman test, then we choose the estimation results using the fixed 
effect model.   
The specification of the estimated equation is as follows; 
 
) 2 ( Timedum
FTAmember A FTAtononFT FTA
Language Adjacency ) ce tan Dis ln(
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Where,  Trade, Y, y, Distance, Adjacency and Language are the same as 
equation (2). Dummy variables related FTA are ‘FTA’, ‘FTAtononFTA’ and ‘FTA 
                                                  
9 We do not apply GMM method for the estimation of equation (2), because of 
problems of excessive diagonal conditions by large time series and a larger number of 
independent variables than equation (1).  14
member’. ‘FTA’ dummy is given unity if a country pair belongs to the same FTA, ‘FTA 
to nonFTA’ dummy is given unity if one country is a member of the FTA but the other is 
not. ‘FTAmember’ dummy is given unity for an FTA country pair during the entire 
sample period regardless of the condition of FTAs, i.e. regardless of the fact if the FTA 
in question is in effect or not in effect.   
The results of the estimation are shown in Table 3. The standard variables for 
the gravity model including GDP, GDP per capita, and distance are generally shown to 
have expected impacts with statistical significance for the case of ordinary least square 
method. Although the estimated coefficient of the difference of GDP per capita for the 
fixed effect model shows the results that are contrary to the result of weighted least 
squares method. Distance and Adjacency are shown to be inconsistent with the 
expectation. It is plausible that these results are caused by correlation with individual 
effect.  
The estimated results on the FTA dummies for many FTAs are found to be 
significantly positive. FTAs, for which positive trade creation are not found, are 
ASEAN-China FTA, Japan-Singapore FTA, and Singapore-USA FTA. These results are 
consistent with our previous findings by using crude indicators in section III.1, as they 
showed the possible presence of trade creation effect for several major FTAs including 
the NAFTA, the AFTA, and the MERCOSUR. It is interesting to observe that for many 
FTAs the trade diversion effect is not identified. Specifically, the estimated coefficients 
on non-FTA dummy are positive and statistically significant for all FTAs except the 
MECOSUR, EU-Mexico, and Japan-Mexico FTAs. 
  An examination of the estimates of FTA country-pair dummies reveals 
interesting observations. The FTAs with positive FTA country-pair dummies can be 
considered to include natural trading partners, since they exhibit larger trade value 
compared to “normal” or “average” levels. Specifically, the ASEAN-China, CER, 
Japan-Singapore, Japan-Mexico, Korea-Chile, and Singapore-USA FTAs may be 
regarded to consist of natural trading partners. Coupled with these points, one finds that 




                                                  
10  See Gilber et al (2004) on the discussions of natural trading partners.  15
III.2.3. Analysis of Selected Industries 
We investigate the trade creation and diversion effects further in detail. 
Specifically, to discern the precise impacts of trade diversion effect on FTA member’s 
trade, we consider the impacts of FTAs on FTA member’s exports to non-FTA members 
and those on FTA non-members’ exports to FTA member separately instead of 
combining these two to analyze trade as we did in the previous section. The 
specification of the estimated equation is as follows;   
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Where, Exportjit denotes export value from countries i to j in year t, as before, Y, 
and y, are GDP and GDP per capita, respectively. Distance, Adjacency and Language 
are geographical distance, common border and common official language, respectively.   
‘FTA’ dummy is given the value of unity when both exporter and partner 
country belong to the same FTA, ‘FTAtononFTA’ dummy is given unity when exporter 
belongs to the FTA but partner is not the member, and ‘nonFTAtoFTA’ dummy is given 
unity when exporter is a non member but partner country is a member to the FTA. FTA 
dummy is expected to capture the trade creation effect, while FTAtononFTA dummy 
and nonFTAtoFTA dummies are to capture the trade diversion effect. For the case of 
trade creation, the estimated sign of the FTA dummy is positive, while for the case of 
trade diversion, the signs of the FTAtononFTA and/or nonFTAtoFTA dummies are 
negative. We call the first type of trade diversion “type 1 trade diversion” and the 
second type “type 2 trade diversion”. In the standard analysis of FTA, type 1 trade 
diversion is recognized but not type 2 trade diversion. We examine the presence or 
absence of these two types of trade diversion. 
 
The Data and Estimation Method 
Regarding estimation of commodity trade, the sample of 63 countries used in  16
the empirical analyses is listed in Appendix Table A3. This list is the same as the one 
used in the previous studies such as in Frankel and Wei (1995), Frankel et al. (1995), 
Frankel (1997) and Rauch (1999). Export values are taken from Commodity Trade 
Statistics of the United Nations. We use five types of products for the estimation, 
namely, food and live animals, apparel, iron and steel, electrical machinery and motor 
vehicles. Details are described in Appendix Tables A4 - A6. We used the pooled dataset 
containing the export values for 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. Regarding the explanatory 
variables, we use the same dataset used for the estimation of total trade. As for the 
estimation of five commodities export, we apply Zellner’s seemingly unrelated 




  The results of the estimation are shown in Table 4. The table shows the results 
for the five different product groups in addition to those for total exports. To begin with 
the results for total exports, we find the trade creation effect for the AFTA, the CER and 
Korea-Chile FTA. The trade diversion effect is observed for the NAFTA, the 
MERCOSUR and the EU-Mexico FTA. 
  The results for the five different product groups show quite different patterns 
concerning the trade creation and trade diversion effects for the regional and plurilateral 
FTAs compared to those for total exports. Contrary to the findings for total exports, for 
the EU, and the NAFTA, the trade creation effect was found for some products. For the 
EU, trade creation was found for food and live animals, apparel, iron and steel, and 
motor vehicles, while for the NAFTA the trade creation effect was found for food and 
live animals, and motor vehicles. Being consistent with the results for total exports, the 
AFTA observes trade creation effect for many products. As for the MERCOSUR, trade 
creation effect was found for total exports, food & live animals and motor vehicles. 
As explained above, two types of trade diversion, type 1 and type 2 trade 
diversion effects, were tested in the analysis. Type 1 trade diversion indicates the 
decline in FTA members’ exports to non-FTA members, while type 2 trade diversion 
indicates the decline in non-FTA member’s exports to FTA members. For the EU, type 1 
trade diversion was detected for electrical machinery, while type 2 trade diversion was  17
found for all commodities except for apparel. It is interesting to note that for apparel 
non-EU exports to the EU were large and EU’s exports to non-EU members in food and 
animals and iron and steel and motor vehicles are much higher than average. These 
findings appear to show that consumption, or demand for apparel was substantially 
large in the EU, while the competitiveness of food and iron and steel was very 
substantial. 
For the NAFTA, type 1 trade diversion was found for all the products except 
food and live animals, while type 2 trade diversion was found for electrical machinery 
and motor vehicles Given the these results on trade creation and trade creation, one 
could argue that the NAFTA market for automobiles is introverted. 
Regarding the AFTA, little evidence is found for the trade diversion. Indeed, 
only one case of trade diversion with statistical significance was found for the AFTA, 
that is, type 1 trade diversion in the case of iron and steel. The findings for the 
MERCOSUR are quite different than those for the AFTA in that many cases of trade 
diversion were found. Type 1 trade diversion was detected for apparel, electrical 
machinery, and motor vehicles, while type 2 trade diversion was found for food and live 
animals, apparel, iron and steel, and motor vehicles. 
The findings for other FTAs reveal several interesting patterns. For 
ASEAN-China, trade between them as well as trade with others countries was 
substantially large for apparel and electrical machinery, probably reflecting active 
international trade in parts and components of these products under the regional 
production and distribution networks, which have been constructed in East Asia by 
multinational corporations. Indeed, all the trade in electrical machinery involving 
ASEAN, regardless of their destinations or sources, are higher than average, indicating 
that ASEAN is a hub for trade in electrical machinery. Bilateral trade between the EU 
and Mexico is substantially large in iron and steel and electronics while non-members’ 
exports of iron and steel, electronics and motor vehicles to the EU-Mexico are shown to 
be quite large, probably reflecting large amount of trade in auto parts with the US under 
the NAFTA. Similarly, EU-Mexico exports to non-FTA members are large for apparel, 
iron and steel and electronics reflecting substantial Mexican exports to the US. 
  Trade between Australia and New Zealand under the CER was shown to be 
higher than the “normal” volume in food and live animals, iron and steel, and electrical  18
machinery. For the Korea-Chile FTA, trade in apparel and motor vehicles are found to 
be promoted/created.   
 
IV. Conclusions: 
  We attempted to examine the impacts of FTAs on trade flows. More 
specifically, we attempted to discern trade creation and trade diversion effects of FTAs 
by using two methodologies. One approach is to compute the importance of intra-FTA 
trade in overall trade of FTA members, and the other is to estimate a gravity equation by 
introducing FTA dummies. 
The results of the analysis revealed several interesting observations. An 
analysis of the aggregate data, or total trade or total exports, strongly indicates that 
FTAs bring about trade creation effect and that trade diversion effect is limited. These 
findings based on aggregate data have to be modified, as the analyses for different 
product categories show different patterns among different products. Our analysis of 
trade diversion tends to show such effect for many products in the case of the EU, the 
NAFTA, and the MERCOSUR but not for the case of the AFTA. 
Our overall assessment of the results on trade creation and trade diversion 
tends to indicate that the MERCOSUR is very closed while the EU and the NAFTA are 
relatively more closed or introverted than the AFTA, the CER. Some FTAs seem to have 
too short a history to show substantial impacts yet. 
Before ending this paper, we would like to point out the limitations of our study 
and future research agenda on the impacts of FTA on international trade. To begin with 
the limitations, we could not include some variables that would have impacts on 
bilateral international trade. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been expanding rapidly 
and FDI is shown to have substantial impacts on foreign trade. Multinational 
corporations (MNCs), which are major suppliers of FDI, dominate international trade
11. 
Indeed, MNCs are actively engaged in intra-firm trade, or trade inside MNCs. These 
observations attest the importance of FDI in explaining bilateral trade, but a lack of 
reliable information on bilateral FDI precluded us from including FDI in the analysis. 
The construction of reliable FDI database is a very important agenda. Another agenda is 
                                                  
11  Kiyota and Urata (forthcoming) showed MNCs dominate international trade in the 
case of Japan.  19
to use a better indicator on the economic cost of bilateral foreign trade. We used 
geographical distance as a proxy for the economic distance. A better indicator reflecting 
actual cost such as the cost of transportation is needed. Third, precise contents of FTAs 
should be explicitly considered. For many FTAs tariff removal/reduction is pursued 
over time according to the schedule rather than immediately after the enactment of the 
FTA. Such phasing schedule has to be incorporated in the analysis of the impacts of 
FTAs on foreign trade.  20
Table 1: Changes in Intra-FTA Dependency in Foreign Trade for Selected FTAs 
 
   1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Relative share  0.58 0.558 0.573 0.584 0.58 0.59 0.622 0.637 0.641 0.638 0.646 0.647 0.653  EU15 
Trade intensity  1.577 1.739 1.729 1.773 1.842 1.825 1.652 1.639 1.682 1.69 1.603 1.631 1.678 
Relative share  0.332 0.348 0.344 0.37 0.379 0.383 0.359 0.361 0.363 0.367 0.372 0.389 0.397  NAFTA 
Trade intensity  1.922 1.952 1.965 2.02 1.852 1.871 1.849 1.954 1.935 1.936 2.092 2.156 2.192 
Relative share  0.156 0.158 0.182 0.192 0.178 0.179 0.164 0.171 0.165 0.163 0.166 0.175 0.177  AFTA 
Trade intensity  4.327 4.269 4.525 4.57 4.388 5.067 5.334 5.212 4.468 4.003 3.804 3.631 3.543 
Relative share  0.089 0.088 0.093 0.076 0.082 0.068 0.091 0.084 0.086 0.099 0.1 0.119 0.141  MERCOSUR
Trade intensity  3.279 3.286 3.776 3.542 3.715 3.334 5.391 5.258 5.261 6.492 6.676 7.686 8.986 
Relative share  0.064 0.065 0.063 0.068 0.073 0.067 0.065 0.075 0.074 0.072 0.074 0.074 0.075  CER 
Trade intensity  4.321 4.273 3.825 4.57 4.464 4.307 4.49 5.249 4.888 4.41 5.065 5.158 5.427 
Relative share  0.036 0.04 0.042 0.04 0.039 0.034 0.034 0.039 0.044 0.046 0.049 0.052 0.051  Japan- 
Singapore  Trade intensity  0.427 0.456 0.482 0.439 0.405 0.367 0.367 0.436 0.465 0.484 0.531 0.542 0.55 
Relative share  0.012 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013  Japan- 
Mexico  Trade intensity  0.153 0.189 0.186 0.165 0.177 0.175 0.136 0.151 0.136 0.125 0.144 0.131 0.149 
Relative share  0.046 0.048 0.051 0.054 0.054 0.053 0.049 0.05 0.055 0.059 0.061 0.067 0.072  China-ASEA
N  Trade intensity  0.542 0.492 0.51 0.389 0.538 0.754 0.726 0.769 0.721 0.644 0.582 0.536 0.479 
Relative share  0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.007  Korea-Chile 
Trade intensity  0.383 0.356 0.274 0.236 0.215 0.268 0.257 0.245 0.223 0.312 0.237 0.262 0.278 
Relative share  0.021 0.021 0.023 0.029 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.03 0.035 0.037 0.038 0.039 0.041  Singapore- 
USA  Trade intensity  0.149 0.145 0.16 0.195 0.168 0.165 0.171 0.201 0.229 0.239 0.258 0.263 0.275 
Relative share  0.006 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007  Mexico-EU 
Trade intensity  0.015 0.024 0.023 0.018 0.02 0.019 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.018  21
Table 1: Changes in Intra-FTA Dependency in Foreign Trade for Selected FTAs (Continued). 
 
   1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Relative share  0.604 0.61 0.617 0.609 0.548 0.559 0.62 0.6 0.595 0.599 0.606 0.599 0.584  EU15 
Trade intensity  1.733 1.753 1.605 1.615 1.499 1.448 1.626 1.701 1.639 1.639 1.612 1.625 1.665 
Relative share  0.41 0.424 0.42 0.434 0.444 0.457 0.468 0.468 0.465 0.459 0.448 0.437 0.43  NAFTA 
Trade intensity  2.081 2.169 2.277 2.297 2.202 2.159 2.148 2.089 2.109 2.186 2.339 2.412 2.387 
Relative share  0.184 0.201 0.204 0.206 0.212 0.209 0.218 0.227 0.222 0.227 0.251 0.251 0.255  AFTA 
Trade intensity  3.173 3.226 3.054 3.071 3.226 3.756 3.798 3.711 3.835 3.901 4.536 4.475 4.485 
Relative share  0.166 0.177 0.185 0.193 0.203 0.209 0.184 0.177 0.16 0.128 0.132 0.134 0.136  MERCOSUR
Trade intensity  9.373 9.979 10.514 10.199 9.801 10.34 10.797 9.863 9.003 8.602 9.34 8.363 7.792 
Relative share  0.081 0.087 0.087 0.089 0.088 0.077 0.085 0.074 0.075 0.078 0.083 0.082 0.076  CER 
Trade intensity  5.584 5.88 6.204 6.055 6.106 5.722 6.336 5.867 5.992 5.976 6.35 6.255 5.618 
Relative share  0.058 0.062 0.064 0.061 0.057 0.05 0.051 0.054 0.046 0.043 0.04 0.04 0.038  Japan-Singa
pore  Trade intensity  0.573 0.608 0.64 0.642 0.625 0.616 0.613 0.618 0.582 0.563 0.545 0.549 0.529 
Relative share  0.013 0.013 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.012 0.014 0.016  Japan-Mexic
o  Trade intensity  0.134 0.137 0.115 0.131 0.129 0.145 0.137 0.137 0.161 0.182 0.155 0.184 0.217 
Relative share  0.084 0.09 0.094 0.094 0.095 0.085 0.089 0.098 0.099 0.106 0.111 0.118 0.124  China-ASEA
N  Trade intensity  0.432 0.422 0.444 0.452 0.495 0.58 0.581 0.599 0.644 0.709 0.757 0.749 0.746 
Relative share  0.009 0.009 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.01 0.012  Korea-Chile 
Trade intensity  0.336 0.338 0.354 0.324 0.351 0.357 0.309 0.267 0.275 0.252 0.279 0.333 0.397 
Relative share  0.044 0.045 0.047 0.048 0.045 0.041 0.039 0.036 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.03 0.027  Singapore-U
SA  Trade intensity  0.268 0.272 0.299 0.304 0.273 0.243 0.226 0.202 0.192 0.192 0.203 0.204 0.191 
Relative share  0.007 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008  Mexico-EU 
Trade intensity  0.02 0.02 0.013 0.013 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.02 0.019 0.022 
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Table 2: Empirical results of regression on total trade, 1950-2005, pooled data 
general FTA dummy 0.7780 0.2070 0.1343 0.1723 0.2385 0.1065 0.1020 0.1482
(0.0871) *** (0.0517) *** (0.0306) *** (0.0546) *** (0.0512) *** (0.0389) *** (0.0243) *** (0.0433) ***
GDP 0.8261 0.3171 0.7681 0.2417 0.9570 0.1056 0.8361 0.3250
(0.0082) *** (0.0706) *** (0.0120) *** (0.0788) *** (0.0072) *** (0.0323) *** (0.0194) *** (0.0461) ***
GDP per capita 0.3560 0.1296 0.5262 0.1090 0.5196 0.1477 0.2938 0.1485
(0.0161) *** (0.0334) *** (0.0675) *** (0.0924) (0.0130) *** (0.0324) *** (0.0839) *** (0.0795) *
Difference GDP per cap 0.0581 0.0075 -0.0062 0.0245 0.0962 -0.0142 -0.0149 0.0138
(0.0153) *** (0.0182) (0.0060) (0.0253) (0.0137) *** (0.0202) (0.0058) *** (0.0142)
Distance -0.9848 -0.3497 -0.6070 -0.1813 -1.2812 -0.1917 -0.7735 -0.2554
(0.0260) *** (0.0691) *** (0.0300) *** (0.0614) *** (0.0240) *** (0.0434) *** (0.0445) *** (0.0374) ***
Adjacency 0.3031 0.0688 0.4799 0.3021 0.9751 0.3361 0.3603 0.0408
(0.1275) *** (0.0435) (0.0457) *** (0.1093) *** (0.1262) *** (0.0853) *** (0.0559) *** (0.0671)
Common language 0.5196 0.2023 0.3051 0.1688 0.8856 0.1002 0.3114 0.0861
(0.0490) *** (0.0460) *** (0.0417) (0.0865) ** (0.0455) *** (0.0295) *** (0.0359) *** (0.0516) *
# of samples 104,199 77,073 5,969 5,791 161,147 118,982 4,277 4,232
Alleano-Bond test AR(2), p-value R-sq=0.622 0.577 R-sq =0.935 0.015 R-sq=0.664 0.160 R-sq =0.977 0.323
Hansen J statisitcs test, p-value 0.010 0.050 0.000 0.278
O L SG M MO L SG M M OLS GMM OLS GMM
1950-1983
All sample OECD countries
1984-2005
All sample  OECD
 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. All variables except dummies are in natural logs. 
OLS are corrected disturbances for heteroskedasticity and first order autocorrelation for the disturbances.  23
Table 3: Empirical results of regression on total trade, 1950-2005, pooled data 
Fixed Effect FE (2000-2005) FE FE (2000-2005)
EU  -FTAdummy 0.8357 0.5436 CER FTAdummy 1.4733 0.5553
(0.0834) *** (0.0848) *** (0.0294) *** (0.7060)
EU-non EU  FTAdummy 0.7890 0.0628 CER - non FTA dummy 0.4513 0.0132
(0.0336) *** (0.0259) ** (0.1021) *** (0.0519)
EU member -0.0525 CER member 1.4805 ***
(0.1813) (0.0589)
NAFTA  FTAdummy 1.7900 0.8045 JapanSingapore FTAdummy -0.5266 -0.2580 -0.0399
(0.2821) *** (0.4463) * (0.0507) *** (0.9410) (1.1124)
NAFTA -non NAFTA FTAdummy 0.3374 0.0425 JapanSingapore - non FTA dummy 1.1557 -0.1043 0.0495
(0.0655) *** (0.0465) (0.0917) *** (0.0584) * (0.0655)
NAFTA member -0.5313 Japan-Singapore dummy 3.1769
(0.2134) *** (0.0375) ***
AFTA   FTAdummy 0.4448 0.5335 JapanMexico FTAdummy 0.1617 0.3580 0.1491
(0.3187) (0.2057) *** (0.0909) * (1.0603) (0.8967)
AFTA - non AFTAdummy 0.5645 0.3358 JapanMexico - non FTA dummy -0.0310 0.0804 -0.0033
(0.0845) *** (0.0556) *** (0.0906) (0.0696) (0.0578)
AFTA member -0.0214 JapanMexico dummy 0.9567
(0.6296) (0.0426) ***
MERCOSUR  FTAdummy 1.6217 0.7103 Korea-Chile FTAdummy 1.0350 0.4862 0.4583
(0.2170) *** (0.2362) *** (0.0298) *** (1.0190) (0.8625)
MERCOSUR - non FTAdummy -0.0977 -0.0277 KoreaChile - non FTA dummy 0.8025 0.2261 0.2076
(0.0718) (0.0452) (0.1060) *** (0.0620) *** (0.0525) ***
MERCOSUR member -0.7095 KoreaChile dummy 2.8301
(0.3205) ** (0.0391) ***
ASEAN-China FTAdummy -0.2694 0.3009 0.2302 Singapore USA FTAdummy -1.5259 -0.0891 -0.1565
(0.3498) (0.3603) (0.3231) (0.1027) *** (1.0148) (0.8626)
ASEAN China - nonFTAdummy 0.6314 0.1524 0.0541 SingaporeUSA - non FTA dummy 0.3742 0.0266 0.0602
(0.0470) *** (0.0331) *** (0.0296) * (0.0713) *** (0.0633) (0.0524)
ASEAN-China member 0.8778 SingaporeUSA dummy 2.3151
(0.3519) *** (0.0570) ***
EU Mexico - FTAdummy 0.5253 0.1501 -0.0688
(0.0779) *** (0.0960) (0.2380)
EU Mexico - non FTAdummy 0.0284 -0.0296 0.1443 GDP 0.8920 0.4821 0.6091
(0.0337) (0.0245) (0.0613) ** (0.0067) *** (0.0167) *** (0.0722) ***
EU-Mexico member -0.6068 GDP per capita 0.4379 0.2953 -0.1355
(0.1529) *** (0.0128) *** (0.0189) *** (0.0664) **
Difference GDP per capita 0.0233 -0.0237 -0.0095













Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively. All variables except dummies are in natural logs. Additional Fixed effects model estimation 
for comparison and robustness check is applied for a sub-sample limited time period during 2000-2005 
because of bilateral FTAs values are few compared to all samples. 24





Apparels Iron & Steel Electrical machinery Motor vehicles Total Export (FGLS
EU  0.7703 0.6662 0.5967 -0.3012 1.0368 0.0207
(0.12) *** (0.18) *** (0.16) *** (0.11) *** (0.19) *** (0.03)
EU to non-EU  0.7217 -0.1029 0.4286 -0.4701 0.2204 0.0651
(0.09) *** (0.13) (0.11) *** (0.08) *** (0.13) * (0.02) ***
non-EU to EU -0.2849 0.2918 -0.4295 -0.2770 -0.4221 0.0988
(0.10) *** (0.15) ** (0.12) *** (0.09) *** (0.15) *** (0.02) ***
NAFTA 1.4850 0.2058 -0.0931 -0.1510 1.7801 0.1771
(0.37) *** (0.54) (0.46) (0.34) (0.56) *** (0.18)
NAFTA to non members 1.5258 -1.4046 -1.2998 -1.3500 -1.8021 -0.3593
(0.12) *** (0.18) *** (0.15) *** (0.11) *** (0.18) *** (0.03) ***
non members to NAFTA -0.1772 1.3760 0.1335 -0.3344 -1.0255 -0.1085
(0.13) (0.20) *** (0.17) (0.12) *** (0.20) *** (0.03) ***
AFTA 2.1318 0.0524 1.1232 3.4151 1.2319 1.2516
(0.25) *** (0.37) (0.32) *** (0.23) *** (0.38) *** (0.18) ***
AFTA to non members 1.6160 0.9667 -0.2719 2.3635 -0.0109 0.7403
(0.13) *** (0.19) *** (0.16) * (0.12) *** (0.20) (0.04) ***
non members to AFTA 1.1183 0.2186 1.2926 1.3385 0.1700 0.4416
(0.12) *** (0.17) (0.15) *** (0.11) *** (0.18) (0.04) ***
MERCOSUR 1.0356 -0.6756 0.0438 -0.3791 0.9261 0.6316
(0.27) *** (0.40) * (0.34) (0.25) (0.42) ** (0.10) ***
MERCOSUR to non members 1.9938 -2.1145 1.3123 -1.4923 -1.0371 -0.1781
(0.15) *** (0.22) *** (0.18) *** (0.14) *** (0.22) *** (0.03) ***
non members to MERCOSUR -0.4971 -0.5836 -0.6750 -0.3685 -0.8025 0.0416
(0.14) *** (0.20) *** (0.17) *** (0.13) *** (0.21) *** (0.03)
ASEAN-China FTA - 0 . 0 4 3 22 . 1 4 7 20 . 7 6 0 41 . 3 4 2 30 . 2 0 6 7 0 . 1 4 9 8
(0.27) (0.40) *** (0.34) ** (0.25) *** (0.41) (0.08) *
ASEAN-China FTA to non member 0.0640 2.1038 -0.1525 1.2794 -0.6104 0.2288
(0.16) (0.23) *** (0.19) (0.14) *** (0.24) *** (0.04) ***
non members to ASEAN-China FTA 0.3144 1.0161 0.7167 0.2976 -0.3270 0.0380
(0.16) ** (0.23) *** (0.20) *** (0.14) ** (0.24) (0.04)
EU-Mexico FTA 0.2638 0.1858 0.8860 0.6179 0.3902 -0.0861
(0.16) * (0.23) (0.20) *** (0.14) *** (0.24) * (0.08)
EU-Mexico FTA to non member - 0 . 0 7 8 30 . 6 9 6 10 . 3 8 4 40 . 4 3 1 60 . 0 1 0 0 - 0 . 0 3 6 8
(0.12) (0.18) *** (0.15) *** (0.11) *** (0.19) (0.02) *
non members to EU-Mexico FTA 0.2692 -0.2322 0.4255 0.4807 0.4203 -0.0333
(0.14) ** (0.20) (0.17) *** (0.12) *** (0.21) ** (0.02)
CER 3.3772 1.3430 3.3295 1.9364 2.3646 2.3427
(0.62) *** (0.92) (0.78) *** (0.58) *** (0.95) *** (0.13) ***
CER to non member 3.0161 -0.2359 0.6336 -0.7938 -0.7446 0.6135
(0.16) *** (0.23) (0.20) *** (0.14) *** (0.24) *** (0.05) ***
non members to CER 0.7683 -0.1393 1.3044 0.4753 0.9031 0.4626
(0.14) *** (0.21) (0.18) *** (0.13) *** (0.22) *** (0.04) ***
Japan-Singapore FTA 1.2022 -0.7567 1.4972 0.2868 0.5173 0.1225
(1.20) (1.76) (1.50) (1.10) (1.82) (0.59)
JPN-SGP FTA to non member -0.2160 -0.8893 0.3838 -1.0362 0.3238 -0.0283
(0.30) * (0.44) ** (0.38) (0.28) *** (0.46) (0.08)
non members to JPN-SGP FTA -0.1294 -0.4016 -0.1870 -0.3780 -0.6197 -0.1467
(0.33) (0.49) (0.42) (0.31) (0.51) (0.08) *
Japan-Mexico FTA -1.4655 -1.4672 0.4236 1.0155 3.6803 -0.1824
(1.19) (1.75) (1.49) (1.09) (1.80) ** (0.27)
JPN-MEX FTA to non member -2.0416 -1.9406 0.2346 0.1822 1.0244 -0.2020
(0.28) *** (0.41) *** (0.35) (0.26) (0.43) ** (0.08) ***
non members to JPN-MEX FTA -0.2207 0.0029 -0.5253 -0.2546 1.0114 -0.0152
(0.31) (0.46) (0.39) (0.29) (0.47) ** (0.07)
Korea-Chile FTA - 0 . 6 4 7 32 . 2 4 8 53 . 6 3 3 02 . 4 7 5 65 . 2 0 3 3 1 . 1 5 6 5
(1.63) (2.40) (2.05) * (1.51) * (2.48) ** (1.01)
KOR-CHL FTA to non member - 0 . 7 0 6 50 . 4 4 2 41 . 9 7 4 41 . 1 5 6 82 . 4 5 8 5 0 . 2 1 5 1
(0.22) *** (0.32) (0.27) *** (0.20) *** (0.33) *** (0.05) ***
non members to KOR-CHL FTA 0.3474 0.6897 1.7014 0.4413 -0.2714 0.0356
(0.24) (0.36) ** (0.30) *** (0.22) ** (0.37) (0.05)
USA-Singapore FTA -0.3753 -2.9938 0.3596 1.7650 -0.9796 0.3007
(1.18) (1.74) * (1.49) (1.09) (1.80) (0.74)
US-SGP FTA to non member - 0 . 0 2 3 70 . 4 3 5 00 . 3 7 4 60 . 0 3 6 6 - 0 . 3 6 9 1 - 0 . 2 9 3 3
(0.23) (0.34) (0.29) (0.21) (0.35) (0.05) ***
non members to US-SGP FTA 0.0995 -3.2893 0.0986 0.6874 0.7500 0.0888
(0.26) (0.38) *** (0.32) (0.24) *** (0.39) * (0.05) *
GDP i 0.6509 0.9979 1.1337 1.1226 1.5668 1.0297
(0.02) *** (0.03) *** (0.03) *** (0.02) *** (0.03) *** (0.01) ***
GDP j 0.7460 0.5025 0.9385 0.7390 0.4776 0.9521
(0.02) *** (0.03) *** (0.03) *** (0.02) *** (0.03) *** (0.01) ***
GDP per capita i -0.3776 -0.6645 -0.2840 0.5173 0.4153 0.1649
(0.03) *** (0.04) *** (0.03) *** (0.02) *** (0.04) *** (0.01) ***
GDP per capita j 0.1466 0.5737 -0.1671 0.1016 0.2228 0.0019
(0.02) *** (0.03) *** (0.03) *** (0.02) *** (0.04) *** (0.01)
Diff. GDP per capita 0.0001 -0.0676 -0.1092 -0.0591 -0.2624 -0.0159
(0.02) (0.03) ** (0.03) *** (0.02) *** (0.03) *** (0.01) ***
Distance -1.0530 -1.1525 -1.2607 -0.7805 -0.7398 -1.0309
(0.04) *** (0.05) *** (0.04) *** (0.03) *** (0.05) *** (0.01) ***
Adjacency 0.3143 0.4081 0.5448 0.2385 0.6578 0.3291
(0.12) *** (0.18) ** (0.15) *** (0.11) ** (0.18) *** (0.05) ***
Common language 0.6401 0.1547 0.2536 0.2873 0.5327 0.4950
(0.08) *** (0.12) (0.10) *** (0.07) *** (0.12) *** (0.03) ***
Constant -9.8376 -15.1344 -23.9805 -30.8073 -37.3431 -29.9456
(0.83) *** (1.22) (1.04) *** (0.76) *** (1.26) *** (0.21) ***
Observations; 4,571 R-sq = 0.559 R-sq = 0.476 R-sq = 0.528 R-sq = 0.641 R-sq = 0.512 # of obs.=13,72   25
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denotes 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. All 
variables except dummies are in natural logs. Sample period is 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. Five equations with 
disaggregated data are applied Zellner’s Seemingly Unrelated Regression, and the estimation for Total exports are 
applied by Cross-sectional time-series Feasible Generalized Squares regression with heteroskedasticity and first order 
autocorrelations with disturbances. 26
Table A1: Empirical studies on FTA effects by gravity equation. 
 
Reference  Period Sector #countries Dependant Var. Explanatory variables    and Results
EastAsia(+,***), EC(+), NAFTA(+)  Frankel, Stein & Wei (1995)  1965-1990 Overall  63  Exports + Imports 
MERCOSUR(+,**), AndeanPact(+,**) 
EU15(+-), NAFTA(+-), MERCOSUR(+,*), Andean(-,**,+) 
Frankel (1997)  1965-1994 Total 
merchandise 63 Exports  +  Imports 
ASEAN(+**), AUS-NZ(+**) 
EEC1(+,***), EEC2(+,**), EEC3(+,***) 
LAFTA1(-,**), LAFTA2(-,*), LAFTA3(-,*)  Endoh (1999)  1960-1994 Overall  80  Exports 
CMEA1(-,***), CMEA2(+,***), CMEA3(-,***) 
EU(-***), EU-import(+***), EU-Export(+***) 
EFTA(-), EFTA-import(+***), EFTA-Export(+***) 
ASEAN(+-), ASEAN-Import(+-), ASEAN-Export(+***) 
GULFCOOP(+), GULF-Imp(+-), GULF-exp(-***) 
NAFTA(+), NAFTA-imp(+**), NAFTA-exp(+-*) 
CACM(+***), CACM-imp(-***), CACM-exp(-***) 
LAIA(+***), LAIA-imp(-***), LAIA-exp(-***) 
ANDEAN(+***),ANDEAN-imp(-***),ANDEAN-exp(-***) 
Soloaga & Winters (2000)  1980-1996 Overall  58  Imports 
MERCOSUR(+***),MERCOSUR-imp(-***), 
MERCOSUR exp(+ ) ASEAN1(+,***), ASEAN2(+,**), ASEAN3(+**,-) 
APEC89-1(+-), APEC89-2(+,***,-), APEC89-3(+-) 
EAEC1(+***), EAEC2(+***), EAEC3(+***) 
Endoh (2000)  1960-1995 Overall  80  Exports 
APEC951(+**,-), APEC952(+,***), APEC95-3(+,***,-) 
FTA*GDP(-,**), FTA*Pop(+,**), FTA*Distance(-) 
Baier & Bergstrand (2002)  1996  Overall  53  Exports + Imports 
FTA*Border(+), FTA*Hazard(-), NFTA*Hazard(-,**) 
EU(+,***), EU-im(+,*), EU-ex(+,***) 
ANDEAN(+,*), ANDEAN-im(-,***), ANDEAN-ex(-,***) 
CACM(+,***), CACM-im(-,***), CACM-ex(+-) 
LAFTA(+,***), LAFTA-im(-,***), LAFTA-ex(-,*) 
MERCOSUR(-), MERCOS-im(-,***), MERCOS-ex(-) 
NAFTA(+), NAFTA-im(-,***), NAFTA-ex(+,*) 
Carrer (2003)  1962-1996 Overall  130  Imports 
ASEAN(+,***), ASEAN-im(-,***), ASEAN-ex(+,***) 
Martinez-Zarzoso & Nowak-Lehmann (2003) 1988-1996 Overall  20  Exports + Imports  EU(+,*), MERCOSUR(+,*) 
ASEAN(+,***), imASEAN(+,***), exASEAN(+,***) 
EEC(+,**), imEEC(+,***), exEEC(+,***)  Elliot & Ikemoto (2004)  1982-1999 Overall  35  Imports 
NAFTA(+,***), imNAFTA(-,***), exNAFTA(-,***)  27
Table A1: Empirical studies on FTA effects by gravity equation (continued). 
Reference  Period  Sector  countries Dependant Var Explanatory  variables  and  Results 
AFTA(+***), imAFTA(+***), exAFTA(+***) 
EU(-***), imEU(-***), exEU(-***), 
MERCO(+***),imMERCO(+***),exMERCO(-***) 
Nguyen & Hashimoto (2005)  1988-2002  Overall  39 Exports 
NAFTA(+**), imNAFTA(+***), exNAFTA(-***) 
EEC(+-,**), EFTA(+,**), EU(+,**), CUSFTA(+,**), 
NAFTA(+***) 
EEC-exp & imp (+-,**), EFTA-exp & imp (+-,**),   
EU-exp & imp (-**), CUSFTA-exp & imp(-, **), 
NAFTA-exp & imp(+-,**), LAFTA-exp & imp(+-,**) 
Cheng & Tsai (2005)  1981-1997  Overall  44 + 57  Exports 




Rose (2005)  1948-1999  Overall  175 Exports + Imports
OECD1(+,***), OECD2(+,***) 
EU(-, agriculture+**),NAFTA(-), AFTA(+**), CER(+), 
MERCOSUR(+-),Andean Pact(+**, agriculture+-) 
APEC(+***) 
EU(+-), NAFTA(-***), AFTA(+**), CER(-***, agri+**), 
MERCOSURopen(-*, agri+***), 
Gilbert, Scollay & Bora (2004)  1984-1998  4 sectors  38 Exports + Imports
Andean Pact open (-***, agri+-), APEC open(+) 
NAFTA bloc effects are significant on vegetable and meat. 
NAFTA trade diversion are on meat, vegetable, fruits, 
sugar,  Jayasinghe & Sarker (2004)  1985-2000  6 agrifood 
sectors  59 Exports + Imports
but diminishing over time. 
GATT(+,***), GSTPbase(-,***), GSTP859095(+,***) 
GSTP9095(+,***), GSTP95(+) 
Africa(-,***), Americas(+,***), Asia(+,***) 
Endoh (2005)  1970-1995  3 sectors;  63 Exports + Imports
Europe(-,*), Oceania(+,*) 
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Table A2: Sample economies; Estimation 1   
ALBANIA CHAD GAMBIA, THE LAO PEOPLE S DEM.REP NORWAY SUDAN
ALGERIA CHILE GEORGIA LATVIA OMAN SURINAME
ANGOLA CHINA,P.R.: MAINLAND GERMANY LEBANON PAKISTAN SWAZILAND
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA CHINA,P.R.:HONG KONG GHANA LESOTHO PANAMA SWEDEN
ARGENTINA COLOMBIA GREECE LIBERIA PAPUA NEW GUINEA SWITZERLAND
ARMENIA COMOROS GRENADA LIBYA PARAGUAY SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
AUSTRALIA CONGO, DEM. REP. OF GUATEMALA LITHUANIA PERU TAJIKISTAN
AUSTRIA CONGO, REPUBLIC OF GUINEA LUXEMBURG PHILIPPINES TANZANIA
AZERBAIJAN, REP. OF COSTA RICA GUINEA-BISSAU MACEDONIA, FYR POLAND THAILAND
BAHAMAS, THE COTE D IVOIRE GUYANA MADAGASCAR PORTUGAL TOGO
BAHRAIN, KINGDOM OF CROATIA HAITI MALAWI ROMANIA TONGA
BANGLADESH CUBA HONDURAS MALAYSIA RUSSIA TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
BELARUS CYPRUS HUNGARY MALDIVES RWANDA TUNISIA
BELGIUM CZECH REPUBLIC ICELAND MALI SAMOA TURKEY
BELGIUM-LUXEMBOURG DENMARK INDIA MALTA SAO TOME & PRINCIPE TURKMENISTAN
BELIZE DJIBOUTI INDONESIA MAURITANIA SAUDI ARABIA UGANDA
BENIN DOMINICA IRAN, I.R. OF MAURITIUS SENEGAL UKRAINE
BHUTAN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IRAQ MEXICO SERBIA & MONTENEGRO UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
BOLIVIA ECUADOR IRELAND MOLDOVA SEYCHELLES UNITED KINGDOM
BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA EGYPT ISRAEL MONGOLIA SIERRA LEONE UNITED STATES
BOTSWANA EL SALVADOR ITALY MOROCCO SINGAPORE URUGUAY
BRAZIL EQUATORIAL GUINEA JAMAICA MOZAMBIQUE SLOVAK REPUBLIC UZBEKISTAN
BULGARIA ERITREA JAPAN NAMIBIA SLOVENIA VANUATU
BURKINA FASO ESTONIA JORDAN NEPAL SOLOMON ISLANDS VENEZUELA, REP. BOL.
BURUNDI ETHIOPIA KAZAKHSTAN NETHERLANDS SOUTH AFRICA VIETNAM
CAMBODIA FIJI KENYA NEW CALEDONIA SPAIN YEMEN ARAB REP.
CAMEROON FINLAND KIRIBATI NEW ZEALAND SRI LANKA ZAMBIA
CANADA FRANCE KOREA NICARAGUA ST. KITTS AND NEVIS ZIMBABWE
CAPE VERDE FRENCH POLYNESIA KUWAIT NIGER ST. LUCIA
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP. GABON KYRGYZ REPUBLIC NIGERIA ST. VINCENT & GRENS.  
 
Table A3: Sample economies and the largest city; Estimation 2 
ALGERIA CHINA,Hong Kong HUNGARY KUWAIT PARAGUAY SWEDEN
ARGENTINA COLOMBIA ICELAND LIBYA PERU SWITZERLAND
AUSTRALIA DENMARK INDIA LUXEMBURG PHILIPPINES THAILAND
AUSTRIA ECUADOR INDONESIA MALAYSIA PORTUGAL TUNISIA
BELGIUM EGYPT IRAN, I.R. OF MEXICO ROMANIA TURKEY
BOLIVIA ETHIOPIA IRELAND MOROCCO SAUDI ARABIA UAE
BRAZIL FINLAND ISRAEL NETHERLANDS SINGAPORE UNITED KINGDOM
BULGARIA FRANCE ITALY NEW ZEALAND SOUTH AFRICA UNITED STATES
CANADA GERMANY JAPAN NIGERIA SPAIN URUGUAY
CHILE GHANA KENYA NORWAY SUDAN VENEZUELA
CHINA,Mainland GREECE KOREA PAKISTAN
   29
Table A4: FTAs included in ‘general FTA’ dummy 
Agreement Member countris and accession enforced year
EC Belgium, Germany, France. Italy, Luxcemburg, Netherland 1958
Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Iceland, Norway
Algeria(1976), Syria(1977), Greece(1981), Portugal, Spain(1986), Romania(1993),
Bulgaria(1993), Austria, Finland, Sweden(1995), Turkey(1996), Tunisia(1998),
South Africa, Morocco, Israel, Mexico(2000), Croatia, Jordan(2002), Chile,
Lebanon(2003), Egypt(2004)
EFTA United Kingdom, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Portugal 1960
Iceland(1970), Turkey(1992), Israel, Romania, Bulgaria(1993), Morocco(1999),
Yugoslavia. FR, Mexico(2001), Jordan, Croatia(2002), Singapore(2003),
Chile(2004), Tunisia(2005)
1970
CACM Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua 1961
CARICOM
Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
Barbados,Belize,Dominica,Grenada,Guyana,Haiti,Jamaica,Montserrat,Saint
Lucia,St. Kitts and Nevis,St. Vincent and the Grenadines,Suriname,Trinidad and
1973
PATCRA Australia, Papua New Guinea, 1977
SPARTECA Australia, New Zealand, Cuc Island 1981
LAIA
Argentine, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay,
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, Cuba 1981
CER Australia, New Zealand 1983
CAN Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Venezuela 1988
GSTP
Algeria(1990), Argentina(1990), Bangladesh(1989), Benin(1989), Bolivia(1989),
Brazil(1991), Cameroon(1992), Chile(1989), Colombia(1997), Cuba(1989),
DPR.Korea(1989), Ecuador(1990), Egypt(1989), Ghana(1990), Guinea(1990),
Guyana(1989), India(1989), Indonesia(1989), Iran(1992), Iraq(1989), Libya(1989),
Malaysia(1989), Mexico(1989), Morocco (1997), Mozambique (1990),
Myanmar(1997), Nicaragua(1989), Nigeria (1989), Pakistan(1989), Peru(1989),
Philippines(1992), Rep. Korea(1989), Romania(1989), Singapore(1989), Sri
Lanka(1989) Sudan(1991) Thailand(1990) Trinidad and Tobago(1989)
1989
MERCOSUR Argentina, Brasil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela 1991
AFTA Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thaikand 1992
Vietnam(1995), Laos, Myanmar(1997), Cambodia(1999)
NAFTA Canada, Mexico, USA 1994
COMESA
Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, DR.Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda,
Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe
1994
CIS
Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan (1993), Georgia(1993) 1994
SAPTA Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Maldives 1995
CEFTA Hungary, Poland, Czech, Slovak, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria 1992
CEFTA accessionRomania(1997), Bulgaria (1999), Croatia(2003)
CEMAC Cameroon, Central African R.Chad, R.Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon 1999
WAEMU/UEMO Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal 2000
EAC Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania 2000
SADC
Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Mauritius, DR.Congo, Madagascar, Seychelles 2000





























2000 Israel - Mexico
Bulgaria — Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Bulgaria — Turkey
Georgia —  Kazakhstan
Chile — Mexico
Georgia —  Turkmenistan
Romania — Turkey
Kyrgyz Republic — Uzbekistan
Mexico - Nicaragua
Georgia —  Armenia
Turkey - Israel
Canada — Chile
Kyrgyz Republic — Ukraine
Georgia —  Azerbaijan
Kyrgyz Republic — Moldova
Armenia - Ukraine
Canada — Israel
Kyrgyz Republic — Armenia
Kyrgyz Republic — Kazakhstan
Armenia - Moldova
Georgia —  Ukraine
Georgia —  Russian Federation
Romania — Moldova
Costa Rica - Mexico
Faroe Islands — Switzerland
Laos — Thailand
United States — Israel
Armenia - Russian Federation
Kyrgyz Republic — Russian Federation
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Table A5:    List of Variables 
 
Variables Definition Expected signs Source
Trade Average of bilateral trade flows((Exportij+Exportji+Importij+importji)/4), deflated by US CPI Rose(2005),  IMF, Direction of Trade Statisti
Export Export value of country i to j UN, COMTRADE
-Food and Live animals - SITC code 0
-Apparels - HS code 61
-Iron and steel - HS code 72
-Electrical machinery - HS code 85
-Motor vehicles for transport of persons  - HS code 8703
GDP log og real GDP + World Bank, WDI, IFS, IMF
per capita GDP log of per capita GDP,  real GDP divided by total population + World Bank, WDI, IFS, IMF
Distance log of distance in kn between the largest city of country i and j -
Adjacency Dummy variable if a country pair has the same common languages. +
Language Dummy variable if a country pair shares a land border +
FTA Dummy variable if a country pair belongs to the same FTA.
EU1 Dummy variable if a country pair both belongs to EU
EU2 Dummy variable if country i is a member of EU and country j is not a member.
EU3 Dummy variable if country i is not a member of EU and  country j is a member.
NAFTA1 Dummy variable if a country pair both belongs to NAFTA
NAFTA2 Dummy variable if country i is a member of NAFTA and country j is not a member.
NAFTA3 Dummy variable if country i is not a member of NAFTA and  country j is a member.
AFTA1 Dummy variable if a country pair both belongs to AFTA
AFTA2 Dummy variable if country i is a member of AFTA and country j is not a member.
AFTA3 Dummy variable if country i is not a member of AFTA and  country j is a member.
MERCOSUR1 Dummy variable if a country pair both belongs to MERCOSUR
MERCOSUR2 Dummy variable if country i is a member of MERCOSUR and country j is not a member.
MERCOSUR3 Dummy variable if country i is not a member of MERCOSUR and  country j is a member.
ASEAN-China 1 Dummy variable if a country pair both belongs to ASEAN-China FTA
ASEAN-China 2 Dummy variable if country i is a member of ASEAN-China FTA and country j is not a member.
ASEAN-China 3 Dummy variable if country i is not a member of ASEAN-China FTA and  country j is a member.
EU-Mexico 1 Dummy variable if a country pair both belongs to EU-Mexico FTA
EU-Mexico 2 Dummy variable if country i is a member of EU-Mexico FTA and country j is not a member.
EU-Mexico 3 Dummy variable if country i is not a member of EU-Mexico FTA and  country j is a member.
CER Dummy variable if a country pair both belongs to CER
Japan-Singapore FTA Dummy variable if a country pair both belongs to Japan-Singapore FTA
Japan-Mexico FTA Dummy variable if a country pair both belongs to Japan-Mexico FTA
Korea-Chile FTA Dummy variable if a country pair both belongs to Korea-Chile FTA
Singapore-USA FTA Dummy variable if a country pair both belongs to Singapore-USA FTA 31
Table A6:    Basic statistics of variable of equation 1 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
 ln Trade 265,522 10.01241 3.43835
 ln GDP 265,414 49.14773 2.63304
 ln GDP percap 265,414 17.15873 1.54378
 ln (dif. GDP pp) 265,414 8.53369 1.37245
 ln Distance 265,522 8.17534 0.80596
 Adjacency 265,454 0.02828 0.16578
 Common language 265,454 0.21627 0.41170
 General FTA 265,522 0.08790 0.28315
 EU 15 265,522 0.00681 0.08224
 NAFTA 265,522 0.00014 0.01164
 AFTA 265,522 0.00101 0.03181
 MERCOSUR 265,522 0.00056 0.02376
 CER 265,522 0.00009 0.00931
 ASEAN-China 265,522 0.00009 0.00951
 EU-Mexico 265,522 0.00198 0.04442
 Japan-Singapore 265,522 0.00017 0.01287
 Japan-Mexico 265,522 0.000004 0.00194
 Korea-Chile 265,522 0.000008 0.00274



























Table A7:    Basic statistics of variable of equation 2 
 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev.
ln Export
-Food and Live animals 11,686 15.3921 2.9395
-Apparels 7,879 12.8962 3.4430
-Iron and steel 7,345 14.5908 3.2123
-Electrical machinery 9,450 15.5264 3.5669
-Motor vehicles 5,737 14.1710 3.6134
ln GDPi 15,689 25.4445 1.5942
ln GDPj 15,689 25.4445 1.5942
ln GDP per capita 15,689 8.5393 1.5164
ln GDP per capita 15,689 8.5393 1.5164
 ln (dif. GDP pp) 15,689 8.7674 1.4551
ln Distance 15,876 8.6719 0.8778
Adjacency 15,876 0.0340 0.1813
Language 15,876 0.1051 0.3066
EU 15,876 0.0453 0.2079
NAFTA 15,876 0.0015 0.0389
AFTA 15,876 0.0050 0.0708
MERCOSUR 15,876 0.0050 0.0708
ASEAN-China 15,876 0.0053 0.0725
EU-Mexico 15,876 0.0265 0.1607
CER 15,876 2.5E-04 1.6E-02
Japan-Singapore 15,876 2.5E-04 1.6E-02
Japan-Mexico 15,876 2.5E-04 1.6E-02
Korea-Chile 15,876 2.5E-04 1.6E-02
Singapore-USA 15,876 2.5E-04 1.6E-02  
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ln GDP per capita 0.5281 1
ln Distance 0.1273 0.0407 1
Adjacency -0.023 -0.089 -0.383 1
Language -0.201 -0.134 -0.174 0.1484 1
FTA 0.1085 -0.008 -0.182 0.1134 0.0731 1
EU 0.1731 0.1826 -0.207 0.0816 -0.017 0.2646 1
NAFTA 0.0419 0.0241 -0.019 0.0586 0.0076 0.0411 -0.002 1
AFTA 0.0145 -0.025 -0.072 0.0634 -0.012 0.1164 -0.004 -6E-04 1
MERCOSUR 0.0218 0.0106 -0.04 0.0885 0.0379 0.084 -0.003 -4E-04 -0.001 1
ASEAN-China 0.0218 0.0125 -0.004 -0.007 -0.016 0.0514 0.0036 0.0036 0.004 0.0033 1
EU-Mexico 0.1027 0.1123 -0.095 0.0339 -0.009 0.1555 0.4906 -9E-04 -0.002 -0.002 0.0717 1
CER 0.0123 0.0185 -0.013 -0.002 0.0279 0.0329 -0.001 -2E-04 -5E-04 -3E-04 -9E-04 -7E-04 1
Japan-Singapore 0.0113 0.0109 -3E-04 -8E-04 -0.002 0.0137 -5E-04 -1E-04 -2E-04 -1E-04 0.0078 -3E-04 -1E-04 1
Japan-Mexico 0.0073 0.004 0.002 -4E-04 -0.001 0.0069 -2E-04 0 -1E-04 -1E-04 0.0056 -1E-04 0 0 1
Korea-Chile 0.0053 0.0037 0.0049 -6E-04 -0.001 0.0097 -4E-04 0 -1E-04 -1E-04 0.0079 -2E-04 0 0 0 1
Singapore-USA 0.0091 0.0077 0.0041 -6E-04 0.0082 0.0097 -4E-04 0 -1E-04 -1E-04 0.0079 -2E-04 0 0001   34
 
Appendix: The Description of the data 
Trade values at aggregated level are expanded dataset provided by Rose (2005) 
up to the year 2005, by using Direction of Trade Statistics (DOT) of IMF. These values 
denote nominal US$, thus we deflated by consumer price index (CPI) of USA (2000=1). 
Export values at commodity level are from the UN’s Commodity Trade 
Statistics database (COMTRADE, available from http://comtrade.un.org/db/). We used 
five commodity data, namely ‘food and live a n i m a l s ’  o f  S I T C  c ode 0, ‘articles of 
apparel, accessories, knit or crochet’ of HS code 61, ‘iron and steel’ of HS code 72, 
‘electrical, electronic equipment’ of HS code 85 and ‘Motor vehicles for transport of 
persons’ of HS code 8703. We also deflated these export value by CPI of USA. 
Real GDP and population data are taken from the World Bank's World 
Development Indicators (WDI). Real GDP are deflated by GDP deflator (2000=1) and 
denote US$. Real per capita GDP is real GDP divided by population. We define 
‘Adjacency’ as a case where countries share common land border, and ‘common 
language’ as a case where two countries have the same official language. The 
information on these two variables is obtained from ‘regional basic data’ provided by 
website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. 
‘Comprehensive FTA’ dummy variable is based on the date in force of the 
notified RTAs to WTO. Regarding the EU and the AFTA, the number of signatory 
countries has increased during the sample periods, thus EU dummy and AFTA dummy 
reflects this enlargement.  35
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